Trinity University

Digital Commons @ Trinity
Political Science Faculty Research

Political Science Department

9-2011

Immigration to Germany: Past and Present Experiences
Peter O'Brien
Trinity University, pobrien@trinity.edu

Follow this and additional works at: https://digitalcommons.trinity.edu/polysci_faculty
Part of the Political Science Commons

Repository Citation
O'Brien, Peter, "Immigration to Germany: Past and Present Experiences" (2011). Political Science Faculty
Research. 2.
https://digitalcommons.trinity.edu/polysci_faculty/2

This Conference Proceeding is brought to you for free and open access by the Political Science Department at
Digital Commons @ Trinity. It has been accepted for inclusion in Political Science Faculty Research by an
authorized administrator of Digital Commons @ Trinity. For more information, please contact jcostanz@trinity.edu.

Immigration to Germany: Past and Present Experiences
By
Peter O’Brien
Professor
Political Science
Trinity University
San Antonio, TX 78212-7200
E-mail: pobrien@trinity.edu

Abstract
Germany long stood as the epitome of the ethno-nationalist approach to immigration.
However, passage of the new Citizenship Law in 2000, which introduced jus soli, seemed
to signal a sea change in the direction of a postnational outlook. This paper warns against
seeing in the new legislation an emerging normative consensus around the kind of liberal
cosmopolitanism advocated by the likes of Jürgen Habermas, Ulrich Beck or Will
Kymlicka. I document the persistent allure and influence of nationalism and point to the
growing appeal and sway of proposals and policies informed by a postmodern normative
outlook. Germany’s normative landscape, like that of most European lands, is highly
complex and contentious, manifesting Kulturkampf rather than consensus as far as
immigration is concerned. The result is a complicated, indeed messy, immigration policy
that defies easy categorization into neat typologies putative in comparative immigration
studies.

Paper presented at the conference “Debating the Immigration-Integration nexus in
Germany and Turkey: Where to Go from Here?” Boğaziçi University, Istanbul, 23-24
September, 2011
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INTRODUCTION
Germany has long stood as the prototype of the ethno-cultural approach in the field of
comparative immigration studies. The New Citizenship Law of 2000, which essentially
replaced jus sanguinis with jus soli, cast doubt on the validity of the dominant neoinstitutionalist methodology of this field with its emphasis on the nation-state and path
dependency. In fact, as I argued in my 1996 book Beyond the Swastika, the roots, both
institutional and ideological, of this liberal, cosmopolitan turn can be traced not only to
the new Aliens Law of 1990, not only to the Kuhn Memorandum of 1978, but to the
Allied Occupation and the immediate postwar efforts to establish in West Germany a
reliably liberal polity and culture in which the Holocaust could not recur. Put differently,
there is not now and there has not been for decades a clear national consensus regarding
immigration policy in Germany that would justify comfortably fitting the land into a
putative comparative typology of nation-states either neatly juxtaposed against, say,
“republican France” or “multicultural Britain,” or since 2000 transferred into the
republican or multicultural category. Immigration policy in Germany, like every other
land in Europe, is controversial, contended and therefore highly fluid, or to borrow from
Gary Freeman (2004, p. 946), downright “messy.”
I want to build off this insight in two ways that I am developing in a new book
project entitled Clashes within Western Civilization: The Politics of Immigration in
Europe. First, Germany must be understood in the context of a much broader and longer
normative debate that is Europe-wide, even world-wide. Here I can only refer the
audience to the deservedly esteemed work of Isaiah Berlin (1979 & 1980), who
illuminatingly chronicled and analyzed the protracted and unresolved philosophical

1

debate between two ontologically, epistemologically and morally incompatible and
incommensurable worldviews that he termed “Enlightenment Liberalism” and “CounterEnlightenment Nationalism.” In his 2000 book Integral Europe, Douglas Holmes
brilliantly applied Berlin’s insights to the politics of immigration, though Holmes chose
to call nationalism “integralism.” Second, I seek to augment Berlin’s and Holmes’
contributions by adding postmodernism as a vying and equally influential normative
worldview in the politics of immigration. Expressed with extreme pith, liberalism
prescribes universal rights protecting the autonomy of the individual to all persons
regardless of nationality as long as they respect the same rights for others as well as
rational and democratic values or procedures (rules of the game) to govern the pluralism
that inevitably results in free societies (Habermas, 1983, Rawls, 1987, Baubıck, 1994,
Kymlicka, 1995, Benhabib, 2004). Against liberalism, nationalism, or what I prefer to
call “particularism,” stresses community and cultural homogeneity in addition to a
political structure designed to protect both (Berghe, 1979, MacIntyre, 1981, Walzer,
1983, Smith, 1991, Waever, et al., 1993, Taylor, 1994, Miller, 2000, Thaa, 2001).
Rejecting both liberalism and nationalism, postmodernism posits invincible relativism
and irreducible cultural heterogeneity accompanied by ultimately irrepressible political
antagonism (Hall, 1992, Gray, 1995, Fish, 1999, Nancy, 2000, Mouffe, 2000). I introduce
the notion of Kutlurkampf to characterize the relationship between the three worldviews.
Kutlurkampf means that none finds itself in a position to defeat or dismiss once and for
all its two rivals as appealing sources of normative legitimacy in the politics of
immigration.
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I aim to show how normative discord born of inveterate Kulturkampf significantly
contributes to the messiness of immigration policy, the fact that it represents “an
awesome accumulation of contradictions” (Schierup, Hansen, and Castles, 2006, p. 77).
Needless to say, normative factors alone cannot fully explain why a certain policy
emerges. Policy analysts have identified a range of non-normative factors that influence
immigration policy. These include demographics (Mayer, 1999), health of the economy
(Simon, 1989, Anderson, 1996), political opportunity structures (Koopmans, et al., 2005),
international crises (Tichenor, 2002), media salience (Givens & Luedtke, 2005), level of
government (Money, 1999), courts (Joppke, 2001), institutional and legal heritage
(Brubaker, 1992), political access (Freeman 1995, Kriese, et al., 1995), ethnic origin
(Rex, 1996), asymmetry of available resources (Castells, 1975, Mann, 1987, Smith,
1999), and administrative rationality or “governmentality” (Cohen, 2009, pp. 116-25,
Foucault, 1991). That said, several studies document the considerable influence of
normative arguments and expectations on immigration policy making (Sniderman,
Hagendoorn, & Prior, 2004, Koopmans,et al., 2005, pp. 182-209, Messina, 2007, p. 76)
Ideally one would integrate normative and non-normative factors into a balanced analysis
that favours no single factor unduly (Tichenor, 2002, Schain, 2008). Given limited scope,
however, I analyse in these pages only normative factors.
THE METHODOLOGY OF PUBLIC PHILOSOPHIES
I employ the concept of public philosophy (Lowi, 1969, pp. 3-21 & 42-66, Favell, 1998)
to structure my analysis of the controversy surrounding citizenship. Of a kind with what
various constructivists label ‘worldviews’ (Weber, 1949), ‘frames’ (Bleich, 2003, p. 14),
‘policy paradigms’ (Hall, 1986), ‘political discourses’ (Connolly, 1993, pp. 22-41), the
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notion of public philosophy represents an analytical construct and tool to help empirically
identify and conceptually organize the myriad normative ideas and presuppositions that
actors willy nilly bring to politics.
I underscore three specific attributes of public philosophies. First, a (significantly
influential) public philosophy rests on foundational ideas articulated by ‘great thinkers’
(by which I mean the kind of savants covered in any standard History of Western
Philosophy text). For liberalism, I have in mind such seminal thinkers as Locke,
Rousseau, and Kant; for nationalism, Vico, Herder, Burke, Renan; for postmodernism,
Nietzsche, Wittgenstein, Merleau-Ponty, Heidegger. Second, a public philosophy is
further shaped by the articulations of prominent contemporary (postwar) intellectuals
who compellingly augment and develop the ideas of seminal thinkers in varied and
nuanced ways that resonate today. Though I have not the space here to explain just how,
these two categories of thinkers are primarily responsible for why the three public
philosophies find themselves in a Kulturkampf unable definitively to defeat their rivals.
Third, a public philosophy turns up in the pronouncements of political actors seeking to
legitimize their policy agendas. In politics, however, normative ideas are most often
deployed as mere fragments of the parent theory. Call them normative sound bites –
“equality for all,” Germany for the Germans,” “The Turks are the new Jews.”
Fragmentation eases inconsistent deployment, because the fragments become
disassociated from the logic and coherency of the larger theory. Add to this what Charles
Taylor (2007, p. 11) calls “mutual fragilization.” This is an inescapable if at times diffuse
awareness of the persuasiveness of rival viewpoints.
We live in a condition where we cannot help but be aware that there are a
number of different construals, views which intelligent, reasonably
4

undeluded people, of good will, can and do disagree on. We cannot help
looking over our shoulder from time to time, looking sideways, living our
faith also in condition and uncertainty.
The resulting diffidence leads political actors to be more willing to compromise their
moral convictions, which in turns enables normative inconsistencies to permeate policies.
The ideas of both “great thinkers” and contemporary intellectuals I access through
their own published writings as well as some secondary interpretations. The ideas of
opinion leaders I tap through their own (or their organization’s) pronouncements
(platforms, position papers, press releases, etc.), media coverage of such individuals and
organizations, and social scientific studies. Due to limited space, presentation of the
evidence of each of the three dimensions will have to remain suggestive as opposed to
exhaustive. As a result, the normative stances I limn below do not pretend to represent
comprehensive descriptions of the ideas of either the theorists or political actors whom I
cite. The nuance thus sacrificed is compensated, I hope, by the breadth of the perspective
gained through an analysis that ranges across the whole of the political landscape.
Specialists hungry for details can pursue them in the provided references – one reason
they are deliberately plentiful.
LIBERALISM
Citizenship and integration courses and tests represent the latest fad in the politics of
immigration. In 2006 Baden-Württemberg and Hesse developed and mandated them for
(would-be) immigrants hailing from predominantly Muslim countries. Most other Länder
subsequently followed suit. The Netherlands first introduced such civics classes in 1998.
The EU has endorsed them while numerous other national and subnational governments
have devised and implemented them as required hurdles for naturalization as well as for
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acquisition or extension of visas. While the courses mandate proficiency in the dominant
language of the receiving country, they also invariably teach and test commitment to the
essential liberal democratic principles and values anchored in the constitution of the
immigrant’s supposedly new homeland (de Groot, Kuipers & Weber, 2009, Joopke,
2007). In fact, the classes comprise merely a part of a more general ‘return of
assimilation’ (Brubaker, 2001) and ‘the retreat of multiculturalism’ (Joppke, 2004)
discernible in the West for the last two decades
Some analysts (Parekh, 2008, O’Brien, 1993) have sought to diagnose this
unmistakable political trend as a symptom of profound liberal diffidence in the face of
cultural diversity of an unforeseen magnitude. In fact, ‘liberal assimilationism’ (Baubıck,
2002, p. 176) rests on sound, inveterate liberal principles, sustained by an abiding belief
in the demonstrated superiority of the universal values enunciated during the European
Enlightenment by luminaries such as Voltaire, Kant, Locke, and Jefferson (Barry, 2000,
pp. 132-40). These liberal tenets (in updated formulation) include first and foremost the
fundamental equality of all human beings regardless of race, creed, nationality, gender,
and sexual orientation as well as the primacy of the moral autonomy of the individual
against the claims of any wider community. Furthermore, all humans must be presumed
to possess the capacity to reason and thus to govern their own lives in self-interested and
self-improving ways. These values are neither culturally, historically nor geographically
contingent and therefore apply to all persons in all contexts (Kant, 1959, Rawls, 1971).
So important are these ideals to individual and collective well-being that the state
ought to protect and promote them against real and potential foes. And this it does best by
actively molding its citizens into informed, open-minded political participants in the
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democratic process. Across Europe in dialogue about immigration policy can be heard
echoes of this basic message that in academic circles receives articulation under such
rubrics as ‘Atlantic republicanism’ (Pocock, 1975), ‘strong democracy’ (Barber, 1984),
‘deliberative democracy’ (Gutmann and Thompson, 2004), ‘liberalism with a spine’
(Macedo, 2000), ‘civic patriotism’ (Laborde, 2002), ‘citizenship education’ (Crick,
1999), “patriotism” (Viroli, 1997), ‘preference competence’ (Buchstein, 1995), to name
but a few scholarly iterations. An international chorus of prominent opinion leaders
including, in Germany Henryk Broder, Hans-Peter Raddatz, Seyran Ateș, Alice
Schwarzer, Necla Kelek, Shabana Rehman, Helmut Schmidt, and elsewhere André Gerin,
André Glucksmann, Emmanuell Todd, Chadortt Djavann, Bat Ye’or, Caroline Fourest,
Ayaan Hirsi Ali, Paul Scheffer, Herman Philipse, Ralph Giordano, Melanie Phillips,
Hugo Young, Farrukh Dhondy, Roy Jenkins, and Niall Ferguson has sounded the
warning. Though the verses of the individual authors may vary, their common refrain is
unmistakable: Islam is inherently illiberal and anti-democratic, and, therefore, pious
Muslims and the organizations that represent them threaten democracy, indeed Western
Civilization itself. Accompanying these Cassandra-like voices are the clarion sounds of
mostly sensationalized, bestselling books and articles as well as widely consumed
documentaries and reportage revealing alarming practices of forced marriage, honor
killings, genital mutilation, anti-Western indoctrination, and terrorist plotting on
European soil (Dirie, 1999, Kelek, 2004, Çileli, 2006). Politicians respond to the
indignation with assurances that their governments will not waver in the defense of
democracy. This was what was meant, well before any talk of integration classes, when
Chancellor Helmut Kohl declared in his first inaugural address that foreigners “must
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decide to integrate” or “return home” (quoted in O’Brien, 1996, p. 98). It is also what
Interior Minister Wolfgang Schäuble had in mind when in opening the German Islam
Conference in 2006 he stipulated that only Muslims who demonstrate an inner
“bedingungslose Anerkennung der demokratisch-rechtsstaatlichen Ordnung” would be
welcome and tolerated (quoted in Amir-Maozami, 2011). A similar liberal assimilationist
tone was to be heard by the German’s counterpart in Austria, Liese Prokop, when she
asserted in 2005: “we have to teach the Muslim women, who allow their husband to beat
them, that this is different in Austria” (quoted in Gresch, et al., 2008, p. 425). Similarly,
Interior Minister Nicolas Sarkozy asserted in the same year:
We are proud of the values of the Republic, of equality between men and
women, of laïcité, and of the French ideal of integration. So let us dare to
speak of these to those we welcome here. And let us bring pressure to bear
so that the rights of French women apply also to immigrant women
(quoted in Scott, 2007, p. 162).
The normative logic of assimilationism implies a guarantee of equal treatment to
the assimilated. Indeed, most European governments, in keeping with the EU’s Racial
Equality Directive of 200, have enacted anti-discrimination legislation aimed at shielding
immigrants from prejudice (Koopmans, et al., p. 249). Germany passed its
Antidiskriminierungsgesetz in 2006, which included establishing the Die
Antidiskriminierungsstelle des Bundes. Angela Merkel condemned Thilo Sarrazin’s
(2010) xenophobic Deutschland schaft sich ab as “ausserst verletzend und diffamierend”
and warned against scapegoating Muslims, who deserve equal respect (Migration und
Bevölkerung, September 2010). Immigrant advocate groups such as the Heinrich Böll
Stiftung, the German Institute for Human Rights, Human Rights Watch, the Open Society
Institute, SOS-Racisme, and Amnesty International work tirelessly to keep the public
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aware of on-going discrimination. Tony Blair captured the essence of the Europe-wide
movement to eliminate discrimination with his much repeated phrase: ‘racists are the
only minority’ (quoted in Koopmans, et al., 2005, p. 243).
As the erstwhile British Prime Minister’s remark suggests, anti-discrimination
legislation typically applies to all persons, assimilated or not. Here emerges an important
variant of liberalism that I term ‘cosmopolitanism.’ In contrast to liberal assimilationism,
which insists that newcomers earn, so to speak, the rights of citizenship through
demonstrated commitment to liberal values, cosmopolitanism asserts that immigrants, by
lone virtue of being human beings, deserve (virtually) immediate access to the full rights
and privileges of citizenship from the countries in which they reside (Carens, 1987,
Tassin, 1994, Rubio-Marin, 2000, Kostakopoulou, 2001, Habermas, 2003, Benhabib,
2004, Beck & Grande, 2007). Citizenship, in other words, should attach to personhood
rather than peoplehood and follow individuals across nation-state borders (Delanty, 2009,
p.131).
Germany’s Citizenship Law of 2000 stands out as an example of realized
cosmopolitanism. Because it established jus soli, it was trumpeted by its Social
Democratic and Green legislators as political sea change in a Germany that had for
decades insisted that Deutschland ist kein Einwanderungsland and had defended jus
sanguinis as necessary for a nation divided by the Iron Curtain and berlin Wall. In truth,
as I have shown elsewhere (O’Brien 1996), the adoption of liberal cosmopolitan values
has deep roots in both the CDU and the SPD that can be traced to the 1970s and were
quite firmly entrenched by 1990 when a Christian Democratic government took the first
major legal step toward jus soli with the Aliens Law of that year. Other states have jus

9

soli as well. France has long practiced it, while Greece introduced it in 2009. As early as
1948, in the British Nationality Act, the United Kingdom guaranteed citizenship to all
members of the Commonwealth. The Netherlands followed suit in 1954 for the
inhabitants of Surinam and the Dutch Antilles.
The pressure toward cosmopolitanism is not likely to abate. The European
Council Tampere Conclusions of 1999 directed member states to confer on third-country
nationals citizenship rights ‘comparable’ to EU citizens. These and other EU policies
have created a “thin Europeanisation” (Geddes, 2000) of rights and privileges for thirdcountry nationals that they do not enjoy at the national level but do enjoy at the
supranational level. Sweden, Ireland, and the Netherlands permit legal aliens to vote in
municipal elections. Pro-migrant advocacy groups maintain a steady chant of
cosmopolitanism with slogans such as ‘open borders,’, ‘des papiers pour tous’ (papers
for all), or ‘Ausländer, lasst uns nicht mit den Deutschen allein’ (Koopmanns, et al.,
2005, p. 207).
Needless to say, by detaching the rights of citizenship from a specific territory or
people, cosmopolitanism promotes cultural diversity. While liberal assimilationism treats
robust cultural diversity as a vice to be overcome, what I dub ‘liberal multiculturalism’
re-conceptualizes it as a virtue to be fostered. By this light, diversity can enhance a more
authentic form of personal autonomy. Vigorous affiliation with a chosen tradition can
enrich and strengthen one’s personal beliefs. Moreover, just such a sense of secure
belonging and connectedness can fortify an individual to resist the fearsome pressures of
conformity in mass consumer society (Raz, 1994, Kymlicka, 1995, Bielefeldt, 2007). If
cultural identity and pride are integral to personal autonomy, as is for example private
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property, then the liberal state should protect them as well. In a plural society, the state
‘should aim at insuring that all national groups have the opportunity to maintain
themselves as a distinct culture’ (Kymlicka, 1995, p. 113). The state adopts a neutral
position, facilitating fair and equal relations among varying, even vying, communities as
opposed to siding with one particular worldview (Raz, 1994, p. 174). As early as 1978,
the very first Bundesbeauftragter für Integration, the erstwhile Minister-President of
North Rhine-Westphalia Heinz Kőhn, stressed that integration could not have anything to
do with “Zwangsgermanisierung” because aliens deserve a “guaranteed opportunity to
preserve their identity” (quoted in O’Brien, 1996, p. 56). Pronouncing that ‘diversity
brings employers tangible advantages’, Kőhn’s contemporary counterpart, Maria
Bıhmer, , threw her support in 2010 behind ‘The Charter of Diversity’ signed by 800
German firms representing 4.5 million employees. Germany is not alone. The Zapatero
government’s Strategic Plan of Citizenship and Integration 2007-2010 has as one of its
principles ‘inter-culturalism, according to which persons of different origins and/or
cultures can interact with esteem and in full respect of diversity’ (Quoted in FerreroTurrión & Pinyol-Jiménez, 2009, 344). The EU’s Race Directive of 2000 states its goal
as ‘promoting diversity’. Indeed, for the last three decades policies of multiculturalism
that aid immigrants in maintaining integral elements of their distinct identities while
simultaneously firmly establishing them in the receiving country have steadily
mushroomed across Europe at various levels of government (Koopmans, et al., 2005, p.
72, Joppke & Morawska, 2003, p. 19). Especially since 9/11, state-sponsored efforts have
intensified to help Muslims maintain their faith (Fetzer & Soper, 2005, Cesari, 2004).
The recently established Deutsche Islam Konferenz and the Conseil Française de Culte
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Musulman are two examples. The thrust of such strivings, various though they are,
typically centers on the formation of some type of ‘Euro-Islam’ that is at once
authentically Islamic but conceived and practiced in a way consistent with the liberal
democratic values cherished in Europe (Tibi, 2002, Ramadan, 2004, Nielsen, 2007).
In its support for cultural diversity liberal multiculturalism can sometimes appear
one with communitarianism. However, the two should not be confounded, for they rest
on divergent philosophical principles. In the former, cultural diversity has no value in and
of itself; it should be permitted and encouraged only in so far as it enhances individual
autonomy (Delanty, 2009, p. 131, Benhabib, 2005, p. 676, Raz, 1994, pp. 186-89, Bader,
1995). For this reason, liberal multiculturalists invariably insist on voluntarism in and the
right of exit from cultural associations and practices (Spinner-Halev, 1999, 73,
Koopmans, et al., 2005, pp. 178-79). As Habermas (1998, p. 222) puts the case:
The constitutional state can make this hermeneutic achievement of the
cultural reproduction of worlds possible, but it cannot guarantee it. For to
guarantee survival would necessarily rob the members of the freedom to
say yes or no…When a culture has become reflexive, the only traditions
and forms of life that can sustain themselves are those that bind their
members, while at the same time allowing members to subject the
traditions to critical examination and leaving later generations the option
of learning from other traditions or converting and setting out for other
shores.
Schäuble (2009), in his popular little book Braucht unsere Gesellschaft Religion? – Vom
Wert des Glaubens, echoes the esteemed liberal philosopher:
Anyone who does not want that, for example does not want their children
– and particularly their daughters – to grow up in an open western society
because they disapprove of various aspects, is making the wrong decision
to settle permanently in Central Europe. One has to accept the conditions
of one's new home (…) as we are not prepared to put the rules of
tolerance, diversity and pluralism up for discussion."
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In 1995, the Austrian government rejected a proposal by the Islamic Congregation – the
officially recognized representative of Muslims in Austria – to make veiling mandatory in
Islamic education classes in public schools (Baubıck, 2002, p. 174). Similarly, Berlin
introduced Islamic education in its public schools in 2005. However, upon determining
that the provider of the instruction, The Islamic Federation of Berlin, was imparting
illiberal, anti-democratic values to pupils, the Senate abolished denominational religious
instruction in its public schools in 2008, opting for a Religionskunde approach. The
British government has for similar reasons dragged its feet in establishing publicly
funded Islamic schools of which there are only seven compared to 7000 Christian schools
(Monsma and Soper 2009, p. 151).
PARTICULARISM
Though much research indicates that European Muslims overwhelmingly support
individual rights (Phalet, van Lotringen, & Entzinger, 2000, Goldberg & Sauer, 2003,
Parekh, 2006, pp. 181-85, Hargreaves, 2007, p. 116, Klausen, 2009, 3), there doubtless
exist Muslim groups and individuals (especially among Fundamentalists and Islamists)
who willfully violate liberal values (Klausen, 2009, 3). Illiberal positions can be cogently
defended under the principles of communitarianism. Though often denounced as
dangerously relativistic (Bader, 1995, p. 216), communitarianism rests on the firm
philosophical footing of the venerable strain of nationalist thought in the Western
tradition. Nationalism’s pantheon of sages includes the likes of Vico, Montesquieu,
Burke, Herder, Hegel, Fichte, Renan, and Mazzini. In divergent ways, these thinkers
rejected the Enlightenment notion of a universal human nature and with it the idea of
universally valid and applicable principles and laws. Humans are products of their

13

particular contexts, be they historical (Vico, 1948), environmental (Montesquieu, 1989),
or cultural (Herder, 1877-1913). It follows that because the contexts are neither identical
nor chosen, humans cannot share a universal essence or nature. They are insurmountably
particular. Each nation, Herder averred, has a unique ‘Seele’. Montesquieu called it a
‘spirit’. Whatever the label, this essence defines not only the nation but its individual
members as well. They experience life collectively as a ‘we’ as opposed to an isolated ‘I’
(Hegel, 1953). Most profoundly, as Burke (1969, p. 194-95) pointed out, nationalism is
experienced as an on-going and quasi-sacred pact or ‘partnership between those who are
living, those who are dead, and those who are to be born’ to honour the nation’s
achievements of the past, enrich those of the present, and make possible those of the
future (also Renan, 1996).
Communitarians of our times invoke similar ideas but apply them to all
meaningful communities, not solely to the nation. Hans-Georg Gadamer (2004, p. 435)
speaks of a common ‘horizon of experience’, Alain de Benoist (1994, 263) a ‘sense of
belonging’, Michael Sandel (2005, p. 258) a ‘common vocabulary of discourse and a
background of implicit practices and understandings’. Taylor (1994) calls for a ‘politics
of difference’ that enables all significant communities to maintain their idiosyncrasies
under ‘the presumption of equal worth’ and the ‘ideal of authenticity’ (Taylor, 1995, p.
233 & 234). Walzer (1983: 314) denounces the imposition of extraneous values on
communities: ‘Since there is no way to rank and order these worlds with respect to their
understanding of social goods, we do justice to men and women by respecting their
particular creations…To override those understandings is (always) to act unjustly’.
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Diasporas of various sorts typically invoke communitarianism when pressing to
preserve their distinct ways, especially when they appear to transgress or affront the
dominant norms and values of the majority culture. In Europe, Muslims, more than any
other minority community, seek exemptions from statute and convention by insisting on
the right to be different (Koopmans, et al., 2005, p. 155, Rohe, 2005, Gresch, et al.,
2009). Take halal butchering, for example. The Islamic rite prohibits stunning the animal
before slaughtering it. In 2002, the Federal Constitutional Court ruled that to guarantee
freedom of religious expression, halal preparation of meats had to be permitted (though
the Bundestag immediately responded with a kind of liberalism for animals by anchoring
their protection from harm in the Grundgesetz, thereby tying the court’s hands). In France
and Britain the practice is permitted (Koopmans, et al., 20005, p. 55). When called on to
justify such exemptions from statute, Muslims commonly enunciate two of the tenets of
communitarianism: 1) the practice in question should be permitted because it is integral
to the minority community (regardless of its reception in the wider society); and 2) only
the diaspora should determine what is integral. Qatar-based cleric Youssef Al-Qaradaoui,
who reaches millions of European Muslims via his programs carried by al-Jazeera,
argues that only the organization which he heads, the Conseil Européen de la Recherche
et de la Fatwa (www.islamophile.org/spip/-Conseil-Europeen-de-la-Recherche-.html),
should determine what is and is not properly Islamic for Muslims living in the European
diaspora. The Koordinationsrat der Muslime in Deutschland would appear to be heeding
his advice. In its negations with the Ministry of Education to establish centers of Islamic
Studies at the Universities of Tübingen, Münster and Osnabrück, which will train imams
and religious education teachers, the council has insisted that Muslims and Muslims
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alone should determine the professors and the content of what they teach (Migration und
Bevölkerung February-March 2010). The Turkish government’s Ministry of Religious
Affairs (DITIB) has steadfastly demanded that it should have the sole prerogative to
provide the curricula, materials, and teachers for Islamic instruction of Turkish pupils in
European schools (Klausen, 2005, Fetzer & Soper, 2005).
Indeed, in efforts to shape the actions of their emigrants abroad, governments of
sending countries have used diplomacy to become influential voices in Europe defending
numerous aspects of transnationalism beyond retention of religious identity (Freeman and
İgelman, 1998). Turkish premiere Recep Tayyip Erdoğan, for instance, stirred up much
discussion in visits to Germany in 2008 and again in 2011 by urging Turks to found
Turkish Gymnasien in Germany like the German ones in Turkey. Receiving countries too
have often embraced communitarian principles. This is true, moreover, not only of
countries, like Sweden (Soininen, 1999) and the Netherlands (Sniderman & Hagendoorn,
2007, Entzinger, 2003), which in the Seventies adopted official programs of
multiculturalism. Often keen to assuage the mounting xenophobia of native populations,
other governments instituted or tolerated forms of ‘de facto multiculturalism’ (Joppke &
Morawsak, 2003, p. 8) with the argument that they were preparing immigrants to return
to their homelands (Palidda, 2009, Gresch, et al., 2009, Koopmans, et al., 2005, pp. 1112 & 31-73, Entzinger, 2000). As was the case with the Kohl government’s
Rückkehrpolitik anchored in the Gesetz zur Förderung der Rückkehrbereitschaft von
Ausländern of 1983, guestworkers had to be given the opportunity to maintain their
native culture, language and ways (among their children as well, for instance, through
specific classes in their own language at school) if they were to be induced to repatriate
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(O’Brien, 1996, pp. 74-104). Despite having motivated relatively few immigrants to
depart permanently, many elements of these programs of ‘reintegration’ in Germany and
elsewhere have persisted to the present and play a significant role in sustaining
transnational communities (Faist, 2000, Kastoryano, 2002, Caglar, 2001). Acceptance or
toleration of dual nationality, which facilitates transnationalism, is on the rise across
Europe (Hansen and Weil, 2002; Faist, 2007). In Germany it is officially verboten but the
ban is rarely enforced (Hansen, 2003, p. 95)
The durable, conspicuous cultural diversity spawned from transnationalism has
helped to generate a xenophobic backlash bent on protecting the majority culture. Over
the past three decades, radical rightwing parties and personalities have regularly garnered
between 10 and 25 percent of the popular vote across Europe. Their electoral success,
moreover, has moved moderate parties of both the center right and left to propose or
legislate measures aimed at reducing the number of immigrants and/or the rights and
privileges which they enjoy (Givens, 2005, Gingrich and Banks, 2006, Messina, 2007).
This was manifestly part of the political calculations that led in 1992 to the agreement
between CDU and SPD to amend Article 16 of the constitution to make it more difficult
for refugees to reach or reside in Germany (O’Brien, 1996, p. 107). The same holds for
anti-immigrant legislation such as the British Nationality Act of 1981, Italy’s Bossi-Fini
Law of 2002, or the so-called Sarkozy Law of 2003, all of which sought to make it harder
for would-be immigrants to enter the land and easier for resident aliens to be deported.
Well before but more intensely since 9/11, Muslims have become the favorite
target of xenophobic antipathy. As early as 1968, Eunoch Powell delivered his ‘river of
blood’ speech presaging civil unrest if the tide of Muslims entering the United Kingdom
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was not stemmed. A decade later, Margaret Thatcher brought this xenophobic perspective
into the mainstream of British politics by complaining of a ‘swamping’ of things British
by foreign elements. In 1982, maneuvering to become chancellor, Helmut Kohl asserted
that ‘the number of foreigners must be reduced’. In the wake of Beur rioting in Lyons in
October 1990, Valéry Giscard d’Estaing spoke of ‘the invasion of France’ and Jacques
Chirac of an ‘overdose of immigration’. Even more alarmist are those who warn that
Islamists are positioning themselves to form and dominate a future ‘Eurabia’ (Ye’or,
2002, Schwarzer, 2002, Ferguson, 2004, Ajami, 2004, Kepel, 2004, Bawer, 2006,
Caldwell, 2009). Udo Ulfkotte (2003) limns the Krieg in unseren Städten: Wie Islamisten
Deutschland unterwandern.
Leftists have denounced these xenophobic tendencies as ‘the new racism’, which
substitutes cultural for biological differences and hierarchies (Baker, 1981, Stolke, 1995,
Taguieff, 2001). I prefer the epithet ‘nativist nationalism’, for these movements and
sentiments, though various in shape and content (Messina, 2007, p. 64), repose on the
same founding notions of European nationalism that inform communitarianism.
However, nativist nationalism places highest (even lone) moral priority on the nation and
nation-state. On this view, history has demonstrated that, despite the efforts of democratic
and totalitarian ideologies and regimes committed to cosmopolitanism, people insist
(often with their lives) upon living in self-governing nation-states (Schnapper, 1998, 98110; Huntington, 2004). Following Hegel (1953, pp. 50-52), a people organically bound
together as a self-governing nation represents the highest political achievement of
humankind, ‘the divine Idea as it exists on earth’. Hermann Lőbbe (1994, p. 38) concurs:
The ‘people’…which is the subject of constitutional authority in
democracies, does not first acquire its identity from the constitution that it
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gives itself. This identity is rather a preconstitutional, historical fact:
thoroughly contingent, but not for that reason arbitrary…it is unavoidable
for those who find that they belong to a particular people.
National solidarity and unity enable the smooth functioning of the political
system. Börkenförde, for instance, has maintained that
a relative homogenization in a shared culture is needed…if the society
which tends to become atomized is to be reunited into a unity capable of
concerted action, in spite of being differentiated into a multiplicity of
parts. This task is performed by the nation and its attendant national
consciousness along with, and in succession to, religion…Thus the
ultimate goal cannot be to overtake national identity and replace it with
something else, not even with a universalism of human rights.
(Frankfurter Allgemeine Zeitung 30 September 1995)
Similarly, British political philosopher David Miller avers that ‘without a common
national identity, there is nothing to hold citizens together (Miller 1992, p. 94). ‘Nations
are ethical communities...The duties we owe to our fellow-nationals are different from,
and more extensive than, the duties we owe to humans as such’ (Miller, 2000, p. 27). Jırg
Haider iterated a (perhaps distorted) version of Miller’s argument when he exclaimed:
‘the right of natives to Heimat is more important than the right of immigrants to family
life’ (quoted in Fillitz, 2006, p. 143). With similar concerns in mind, the Danish political
scientist Ole Waever (1993, pp. 23-26) contends that ‘societal security’ should be granted
equal priority alongside national and social security by nation-states. Societal security
constitutes ‘the ability of a society to persist in its essential character under changing
conditions and possible or actual threats’. It entails ‘the sustainability…of traditional
patterns of language, culture, association, and religious and national identity and custom’.
It exists when a people does not have to fear that ‘we will no longer be able to live as
“us”’. Essentially the same argument did the 15 German professors who published the
Heidelberg Manifesto in 1982 advance:
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Peoples are…living systems of a high order, each with its own systematic
characteristics which are transmitted genetically and through tradition. For
this reason the integration of large masses of non-German foreigners is
impossible for the simultaneous preservation of our people, and leads to
the well-known ethnic catastrophes of multicultural societies. (quoted in
Chin, 2007, p 148)
The influential French professor, Dominique Schnapper (1998, 116) avers that
homogeneity of population is not enough to create a nation, but it is true
that it favors the interaction of social life and a political society. This is
why the formation of the nation was always accompanied by policies
aimed at reducing particularisms, not only political, but cultural.
Something of the same logic informs the comments by Angela Merkel and David
Cameron to the effect that multiculturalism has failed (‘and failed utterly,’ according to
the chancellor).
On this view, immigrants are to be tolerated only on condition that they assimilate
to the majority culture. This outlook turns up in naturalization requirements that demand
a manifestation of, say, ‘Britishness’ (quoted in Ryan, 2009, pp. 290-91), ‘feeling Dutch’
(quoted in Van Oers, 2009, p. 128) or a ‘voluntary and lasting orientation toward
Germany’ (quoted in Hansen, 2003, 91). The French, of course, purport that their
requirement of assimilation à la communauté française is based on the universal
republican principles of the French Revolution. And yet, the web page of the Ministry of
Justice instructs prospective applicants that they need to be ‘well assimilated to the
French customs and manners’. In practice, for instance, French officials are known to
automatically deny naturalization to Muslims who observe the pious duty to pray five
times daily at prescribed moments (Klausen, 2005, p. 21; on Denmark, see Mouritsen,
2006 and, on Italy, Triandafyllidou, 2006). In Germany, particularly before 2000,
officials considered membership in an ethnic or Islamic association as grounds for denial
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of naturalization (Hansen, 2003, p. 91). Is this trend likely to change, when the current
Interior Minister, Hans-Peter Friedrich, asserts, as he did when assuming office in 2011,
that ‘Islam gehört nicht zu Deutschland’ (Deutsche Welle 30 March 2011)?
Nativist nationalism tends to exhibit an unmistakable propensity to view
immigrants with suspicion as a potential threat to the well-being of the nation. The
philosophy here retains some of the ‘friend-foe’ distinction in the thought of the German
nationalist Carl Schmitt (1996). The Nazi enthusiast maintained that in order to overcome
internal frictions – to treat one another as friends -- a folk needed to have a designated foe
against whom to unite. Today around Europe that enemy designate is doubtless Muslims.
Listen, for example, to Frits Bolkestein, erstwhile parliamentary leader of the People’s
Party for Freedom and Democracy: ‘One must never underestimate the degree of hatred
that Dutch people feel for Moroccan and Turkish immigrants. My political success is
based on the fact that I was prepared to listen to such people’ (quoted in Buruma, 2006, p.
64). Clifford Longley, in an editorial to the Times (8 July, 1989) entitled ‘A very British
lesson Muslims must learn’, cautioned Islamic immigrants not to underestimate British
resolve to protect their way of life: ‘the white tribes of Britain can be every bit as
stubborn and intransigent, and no less forceful in defense of their beliefs, as the brown
tribes’. In 2010, Bundesbank board member Thilo Sarrazin (2010) made the bestseller list
in Germany with his opprobrious claim that ‘Germany is destroying itself’ by allowing
untold numbers of inassimilable Muslims to reside in the fatherland.
POSTMODERNISM
Postmodernism interprets xenophobia as confirmation of the inescapable and
insurmountable cultural and political antagonisms endemic to the ‘postmodern
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condition’ (Lyotard, 1984). Nationalism winsomely posits a hopelessly utopian and
nostalgic dream world of cultural homogeneity. The only real community, claims JeanLuc Nancy (1991), is ‘the inoperative community’. Similarly, liberalism quixotically
chases after universal principles despite the demonstrated futility of the ill-conceived
endeavor (Gray, 1995, pp. 85-95). Etienne Balibar (2004, p. 201) insists
there can be no new ‘Leviathan’ that would regulate belief and officialize
knowledge (‘institute the truth,’ as the modern state has done through its
schools and universities), and there is even less possibility for a new ‘civic
religion’ that would relativize ‘traditional’ or ‘revealed’ religions and
relegate them to private choice.
Nietzsche sired postmodernism. It was his seminal insight that all truth claims are
historically and contextually contingent. They cannot be universal because they are
always views from a particular perspective – why Nietzsche (1968) labeled the idea
‘perspectivism’. Heidegger, Wittgenstein and Merleau-Ponty in differing ways went on to
explain tellingly how our particular perspective evolves from and is embedded in the dayto-day practice of our lives (Solomon, 1987, pp. 178-82). What the Frenchman termed
‘prereflective consciousness’ colors our understanding of the world, closing our eyes to
some dimensions while opening them to others. No person or idea is above bias
(Merleau-Ponty, 1962). Charlotte Nordmann and Jérôme Vidal (2004), for example,
contend that the very republicanism that French liberals lionize for its universalism is
itself as much a product of a particular outlook and experience as the Islamic
fundamentalism that republicans vilify. Schirin Amir-Moazami (2005, p. 271) has taken
like aim at the purported ‘neutrality’ of Germany’s brand of secularism. Across the
channel, Bhikhu Parekh (2000, p. 13) underscores the contextual contingency that
liberalism cannot overcome.
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Liberalism is a substantive doctrine advocating a specific view of man,
society and the world and embedded in and giving rise to a distinct way of
life. As such it represents a particular cultural perspective and cannot
provide a broad and impartial enough framework to conceptualise other
cultures or their relations with it.
Though the two concepts share some similarities, postmodernism’s perspectivism
differs from nationalism’s “rootedness.” To begin with, nationalist tenets posit a single,
hermetically sealed cultural homogeneity that gives holistic meaning and identity to those
who live under its influence. Postmodernism, by contrast, maintains that persons are
increasingly confronted with and simultaneously influenced by multiple, intersecting
perspectives that undermine coherent experience. Whether they characterize it as
‘schizophrenia’ (Delueze and Guatarri, 1987), différance (Derrida, 1991), ‘being singular
plural’ (Nancy, 2000) ‘together-in-difference’ (Ang, 2001, p. 200) or ‘many in one’
(Balibar, 2004, p. 26), postmodern diagnosticians of unending and unexampled alterity
and hybridity have something similar in mind to what Stuart Hall (1992, p. 277 & 287)
describes:
The fully unified, completed, secure and coherent identity is a fantasy.
Instead, as the systems of meaning and cultural representation multiply,
we are confronted by a bewildering, fleeting multiplicity of possible
identities, any one of which we could identify with - at least
temporarily…Modern nations are all cultural hybrids.
Immigration, in particular, creates an atmosphere of ‘super-diversity’ (Vertovec, 2007)
that intensifies the ‘instability and mutability of identities which are always unfinished,
always being remade’ (Gilroy, 1993, p. xi).
Postmodern theory furthermore reads into all truth claims an ineluctable political
dimension – what Nietzsche (1968) diagnosed as the ‘will to power’. Influenced by
Edward Said’s seminal Orientalism (1978), postcolonial scholars and many Muslim
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organizations contend that the great hullabaloo over the alleged threat posed by Islam to
European societies is less about the defense of freedom and equality and more about the
deliberate demonization and continued domination of Muslims by Europeans (El Guindi,
1999, p. 184, Lamont, 2000, pp. 212-13, Schiffauer, 2007, p. 86, Scott, 2007, pp. 42-89,
Sayyid, 2009, pp. 198-99). The ‘Feindbild Islam’ (Naumann, 2010, p. 19) has deep roots
in European history and feeds directly into the ‘Islam-bashing für jedermann’ (Gerhold,
2010, p. 345) common in contemporary Europe. Particularly but not exclusively in
Germany, one hears the analogous argument that Islamophobia represents a kind of new
anti-Semitism (Benz, 2009). Turkish rags with a wide distribution in Germany, such as
Gőnaydin or Milliyet, frequently refer to Turks as ‘Germanys new Jews’.
Once all truth claims are exposed as ultimately contingent and self-serving, there
can be no escape from the vicissitudes of politics into the reassuring certainty of
metaphysics. ‘Truth’ or ‘right’ becomes nothing more than what has been made to pass
for truth or right (Baudrillard, 1996, Fish, 1999). A case in point is Islamist organizations
in Europe that persistently succeed in convincing their adherents of ‘truths’ deemed
absurd by the European mainstream (Modood, 2002, pp. 121-22, Roy, 2004, p. 140). As
far as citizenship is concerned, postmodernism conceptualizes it as neither an inalienable
right anchored in universal ethics (or even in a legal constitution) nor a firm identity
rooted in a nation. Citizenship is rather a political prize won through the ‘perennial’ giveand-take of politics (Cohen, 2009, p. 96-97). The politics of immigration, claims Werner
Schiffauer (2007, p. 79), ‘must almost by necessity lead to an agonising conflict-oriented
fight for recognition’.
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Because the outcomes of political contestations vary, citizenship is inherently
protean, “plastic” (Konsta & Lazaridis, 2010) as well as ‘multi-layered’ (Yuval-Davis,
1999, 120). Thus, in addition to conventional (full) citizens, scholars have identified ‘dual
citizens’ (Faist, 2007), ‘alien citizens’ (Bosniak, 2006), ‘hybrid citizens’ (Stasiulis, 2004),
‘fragmented’ citizens (Wiener, 1997), ‘semi-citizens’ (Cohen, 2009), ‘denizens’
(Hammar, 1990) and ‘margizens’ (Castles and Davidson, 2000). We are witnessing the
‘irregularization of immigration’ whereby increasing numbers of migrants do not have a
formal or secure status (Engbergsen, 2001, 222). The ‘flexible’ nature of citizenship
tends to foster instrumentalism. Increasingly individuals assume whatever available form
of citizenship that produces the most advantage for them in a particular time and place
(Ong, 1999; also Engbergsen, 2001). Virtually all sending countries honor dual
citizenship, in part at least, as a way to keep much coveted remittances (estimated to be in
the $100 billions annually) pouring back into their economies (Vertovec, 2004; Freeman
& İgelman, 1998). Receiving countries have a documented track record of adeptly
controlling migration to serve their perceived economic interests (Messina, 2007),
including turning a blind eye to illegal immigration that supplies cheap labor to industry
(Verstraete, 2003, p. 228; Schierup, Hansen and Castles 2006). In justifying his
government’s introduction in 2005 of a “green card” program preferring select groups of
migrants, Gerhard Schroeder crassly opined: ‘there are people we need and there are
people who need us’. A year later Sarkozy contrasted desired immigration choisie and
suffered immigration subie (a proposal actually first put forth by Socialists in 1998).
Britain has had a Highly Skilled Migrant Program since January 2002.
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The postmodern point, again, is that one’s citizenship status necessarily results
from political decisions subject to ceaseless contestation. Furthermore, these inescapable
struggles are not confined to formal politics. Some stigmatized immigrants, like Muslims
in Europe, even after naturalizing, suffer informal discrimination to an extent that they
experience citizenship differently from unstigmatized ‘fellow citizens’ (Essed, 1991,
Ong, 1999, Rumbaut, 2002, Brysk, 2004, Tibi, 2006, Phillips, 2006, Bloemraad,
Korteweg, & Yurdakul, 2008, Cohen, 2009). By the same token, stigmatized groups are
far from powerless. Of course, they can and do protest through official channels. But
typically in ethnic enclaves they often manage to establish countervailing conditions of
de facto citizenship more favorable to them. A striking example of such self-customized
citizenship comes from numerous areas in Europe with dense concentrations of Islamists
where significant elements of sharia (for example, mandatory veiling or polygamy) are
regularly practiced and enforced (Leitner and Ehrkamp, 2003, Roy, 2004, pp. 281-82,
Kastoryano, 2006, pp. 66-67, Saharso, 2007). This type of conflicting claims to
sovereignty became particularly poignant and salient during the Salman Rushdie Affair
when the Muslim Parliament UK – a legal immigrant organization – issued a fatwa
calling for the author’s execution, and added that it intended to utilize every means at its
disposal to carry out its law on British soil (Koopmans, et al., 2005, p. 165). All of
Europe witnessed again on September 11, 2001 just how radically different the mood,
culture, and identity of such Islamist enclaves could be as some of their inhabitants
cheered the destruction of the two towers while the rest of Europe commiserated with
America. Indeed, some element of the plot appears to have been planned or prepared in
Germany at the al-Quds mosque in Hamburg. Of course, these acts of defiance against
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the West led to violent clashes between Muslims and non-Muslims. And there have, of
course, been others, for instance, in Bradford, Burnley, Oldham in the summer of 2001 or
following the murder of Theo van Gogh in 2004. These are the nastiest examples of what
some deplore in the so-called ‘parallel society’ (Cantle, 2004). Hard-line postmodernists
regret such degeneration of political difference into violence but warn that no one can
devise a full-proof recipe to prevent it in a Hobbesian world lacking an overwhelming
Leviathan to keep the peace (Gray, 1995, p. 90, Fish, 1999, p. 240). Just such Hobbesian
postmodern candor did Tariq Modood (1990, p. 144) express when he called Muslims
‘the group that British society is currently being forced to adjust to or defeat’. Most of
Europe’s cities, explain Diken and Lausten (2008, p. 245) contain an “Islamic ghetto”
and are therefore “always already antagonistic. The city is an antagonism…that can only
be united through fantasy.” Youth fora in Berlin’s Kreuzberg borough pose the open
question ‘Zusammenwachsen oder Zusammenprallen der Kulturen?‘(Spiegel 14
November 2005).
Not all (including Modood, 2006) believe postmodern politics has to be so starkly
Hobbesian or necessarily result in the dreaded parallel society. Hospitable as opposed to
Hobbesian postmodernism also offers no guarantee of harmony, neutrality, certainty or
stability but refuses to jettison the possibility that rival parties adhering to fundamentally
different worldviews can learn to interact with one another via mutually respectful and
beneficial practices. Rushdie himself, for instance, encourages readers to celebrate
‘hybridity, impurity, intermingling, the transformation that comes from new and
unexpected combinations of human beings, cultures, ideas, politics, movies, songs’
(quoted in Joppke, 1996, p. 488). Julia Kristeva (1991) argues that deep down we are
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each of us strangers to ourselves – an unavoidable state of the human condition which,
however, can be tapped to ease and encourage openness vis-à-vis foreigners. In order to
reap the benefits of insurmountable difference, opposing parties must resist the tempting
urge to denounce and dismiss one another. Richard Rorty (1989), for example, proscribes
cruelty toward others. Kristeva (1991, pp. 75-76) adds oppression to the list of
discouraged practices, Stuart Hall (2000, p. 232) ‘inferiorisation’. Chantal Mouffe (2000,
p. 9) dubs her preferred manner of co-existence ‘agonistic pluralism’ in which differing
parties come to see themselves not as Schmitt’s foes, but as ‘adversaries, adversaries
being defined in a paradoxical way as “friendly enemies”, that is, persons who are friends
because they share a common symbolic space but also enemies because they want to
organize this common symbolic space in a different way’. Balibar (2004, p. 76) urges
‘citizenship without community’, while Romand Coles (2005, p. xiii) endorses ‘a
democratic ethos that cultivates tension-dwelling’. ‘Such a starting point’, Ash Amin
(2004, p. 4) envisages, ‘suggests that empathy/engagement with the stranger could
become the essence of what it is to be “European”’.
Hospitable postmodern encounters must be open-ended, totally void of
unquestionable presumptions and foregone conclusions. No topic, no perspective may be
considered taboo. Indeed, the legitimacy of the very ground rules of the meetings must
remain open to debate (Lefort, 1988, p. 39). Hilmar Hoffmann, Cultural Minister for the
city of Frankfurt, underscores that deep diversity ‘makes any all-inclusive ideology,
religion, or worldview impossible… Whoever merely speaks of the preservation of a
cultural identity, be it of Germans or foreigners, misunderstands the dynamic character of
the cultural [exchange] process’ (quoted in Chin, 2007, p. 213). Parekh (2008, p. 52),
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who headed the Runnymede Trust Commission, explains: ‘since every dominant group
tends to impose the principles of justice that serve to legitimize its domination, we need
to counter it by seeking out those it marginalizes or silences and ensuring their adequate
representation in deliberative bodies’. Lacking consensus on principles, such bodies
should seek a ‘pragmatic, case-by-case, negotiated approach to dealing with controversy
and conflict: not an ideological, “drawing a line in the sand” mentality’ (Modood, 2009,
p. 180). Indeed, studies reveal that across Europe Muslims and non-Muslims more often
than not do manage to find pragmatic solutions to the conflicts that divide them
(Liederman, 2000, Modood and Kastoryano, 2006, pp. 174-75, Mushaben, 2007, Faist,
2009, Korteweg and Yurdakul, 2009, Wise and Velayutham, 2009). Sadly, such
commonplace accommodations between parents and teachers, workers and bosses,
imams and ministers do not receive the media coverage given to the less frequent
conflicts that elude resolution.
CONCLUSION
Schain (2008), like Freeman (2004) and Schierup, Hansen and Castles (2006) cited in the
introduction, underscores the messiness of immigration policies. In his transatlantic
comparative study he finds a ‘contradiction of policies in different arenas’ (276) that
governments regularly and quite knowingly, if tacitly, tolerate (283). Such glaring
inconsistencies, he avers, ‘reflect the complexities of the democratic political process’
(Schain, 2008, p. 275). This paper has tried to show that normative discord represents a
critical element of the political process. But more than mere philosophical discord
between liberalism, particularism and postmodernism is at work. In politics, as opposed
to philosophy seminars, what I call “normative fragmentation” is equally or even more
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important. Most political actors, as we have seen, deploy but fragments of the grander
theories. When detached from the parent theory, fragments are used by political agents
with little or no regard for logical consistency. Indeed, the fragments do not in the
detached form come across as contradictions but rather as moral legitimizations apropos
for a particular political setting or argument. Normative fragmentation or muddle
permeates political rhetoric and from there finds its way into policy itself. It is important
to realize, however, that the intense normative fragmentation depicted above would not
be possible in the absence of the deeper philosophical discord separating the three public
philosophies, that is, the incompatibility and incommensurability underscored by Berlin
(and augmented by me with regard to postmodernism). The clashing of the three public
philosophies at the level of pure theory yields sharper shards that make the battles on the
ground both fiercer and messier than they would be in the absence of the theoretical
conflict. If virtually all significant political actors in the politics of immigration were
committed liberals, as some analyses of the 1970s contend was largely the case
(Schierup, Hansen and Castles 2006, p. 28, Messina, 2007, pp. 188-89), they would still
debate how best to integrate Muslim newcomers, some, for instance, siding with a
stronger others with a weaker role for the state to play in socializing migrants to liberal
values. The nature of the conflict changes altogether when actors enter the field outfitted
with nationalist normative artillery campaigning that the newcomers should be deported
as opposed to integrated. The intensity of the fighting raises yet another level when
newcomers wielding postmodern weapons claim that they plan to stay whether welcome
or not and have no intention of adopting the predominant norms and values of what they
see as a ravagingly cruel society. Moreover, as we have seen, the politicking takes place
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within a fully internationalized normative political landscape in which actors are keenly
aware of what is happening and being argued in countries beyond their own. For this
reason, it is becoming increasingly problematic to talk of German immigration politics
and policy in the sense of being distinct, say, from French or British despite the
prominence of this nation-state, path-dependency approach in the field of immigration
studies (Brubaker, 1992, Joppke, 1996, Koopmans, et al., 2005). Normatively speaking,
the discourse is fully internationalized. It, furthermore, is the continuation of an
inveterate intra-civilizational Kulturkampf (contra Huntington’s inter-civilizational
‘clash’ thesis) the appreciation of which can help us better to comprehend “the
bewildering diversity” (Bader 2007, p. 26) of immigration policies and politics.
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